There is a distinction in ethics between externalism and internalism. Externalist ethics strives for universal claims - claims that apply to every person at every time. It is, thus, forced to also distinguish between the "truth" and "acceptance" conditions of behavior. It may be true that I should never lie, but my reason for not lying might have nothing to do with a universal imperative. (In fact, knowledge of certain universal imperatives - like the consequentialist "greatest good for the greatest number" - might cause me to do things which oppose it - mispredict what will be good for myself and others.) Internalist ethics, on the other hand, claims that an imperative only has truth insofar as it applies to situations in people's lives. It is an anti-theoretical approach to ethics. Now, Bernstein argues that this distinction is not a formal distinction - one in which the different types of ethics cover different terrains - but a contentual distinction - one about the attitude that they represent in the world. In internalist ethics, a person's motivations can contain patterns (of thought, of attachment, etc.), that is, motivations that lots of people have, and internalist ethics does not preclude the claim that "education, training, experience, imagination, and reflection" all contribute to our motivations (13), such that pretty much any originally externalist truth can be incorporated into an internalist explanation of motivations. The difference between the two ethics is that behind externalist ethics is "the experience of disenchantment" (14). Arguments against externalist ethics argue that this ethics fails to take into account - it "is indifferent to, squandes, and distorts" - "individual ethical experience" (15). It is an attempt to return the individual into a form of ethics - like the disenchantment of science/commerce above - that has quantified the individual. Bernstein claims that this objection comes from a standpoint of "hurt" (15), which is part of what Adorno means by a "damaged life" (see, __Minima Moralia: Reflections from a Damaged Life__) - that is, the person who objects to theories is objecting from a personal worry, not indifferent philosophical curiosity. The objections do not let up, not only because they are strong objections, but because the objectors are unwilling to stop objecting. It is through this hurt, in fact, that internalism and externalism become opposing ethics. When people are uncomfortable with externalist ethics, they are uncomfortable with the disenchantment of externalization, not with its claims. Adorno argues